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RESTITUTION- 1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
WILLIAM WICKER*

Civil remedies may be grouped under three classifications: torts,
contracts, and restitution. The plaintiff's objective in a tort action is
a recovery for his loss which resulted from the defendant's wrongful
act, the measure of recovery being the amount of that loss expressed
in dollars. The plaintiff's objective in a contract action is a recovery
for a breach of the defendant's promise, the measure of recovery being
the net addition to the plaintiff's estate which would have resulted
had defendant performed his promise. Restitution is a giving back of
what has been taken away unjustly. The plaintiff's objective in a suit
for restitution is a recovery of the specific benefit to defendant, or its
value. The measure of the recovery in a suit for restitution is the
addition to the defendant's holdings resulting from his wrongful act.
To recover in restitution, the plaintiff must be out-of-pocket and the
defendant must be in-pocket, and further, it must be inequitable for
the defendant to keep the benefit.
A right to restitution may be enforced either by an action at law
or by a suit in chancery. Substitutional redress may be obtained by
way of a recovery of a judgment for a stated sum in an action at law,
or specific reparation may be attained by way of an equitable decree
that the defendant is a constructive trustee for plaintiff of the specific
property of which the plaintiff has been deprived.
There are only five Tennessee restitution cases reported in the
Southwestern Reporter for the year covered by this survey. The remedies sought in those cases were rescission, constructive trust and
resulting trust. The cases will be analysed under those three headings.
RESCISSION

The general objective of the remedy of restitution is to restore the
plaintiff to the position he was in before the occurrence of the transaction of which he complains. Even though the plaintiff has sufficient
grounds for rescinding a contract, ordinarily he is not entitled to that
remedy unless he puts the defendant back in the position the defendant
occupied before the contract was made. Christianv. Pan Ar & Southern Corp.' shows, however, that a party who makes an alteration in a
contract that is both fraudulent and material need not be restored
to his former position.
A party who is guilty of making a fraudulent and material alteration in a written contract cannot recover on the contract. The Chris* Dean, University of Tennessee College of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 309 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
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tian case goes a step further and also denies such a party the right to
be put back into the position he was in before the fraudulent alteration
was made. In that case a release of a prior lease was part of the consideration for a new lease. After the new lease was executed, lessee
fraudulently inserted a clause in the new lease materially altering it
by requiring lessor to make repairs which would cost approximately
$3,000. The Tennessee Court of Appeals held (Judge Howard dissenting) that lessor was entitled to a rescission of the new lease and
lessee was not entitled to reinstatement of the old lease.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

Where a defendant acquires property under such circumstances
that he may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity
will declare him to be a constructive trustee of the property for the
person equitably entitled to it. This means that the party equitably
entitled to the property has the same remedies against the holder of
the legal title as he would have if such holder were an express trustee.
The constructive trust is merely a procedural device which will give
specific restitution of a received benefit in order to prevent an unjust
enrichment.

A defendant is not unjustly enriched, however, unless the plaintiff
is unjustly deprived of property to which the plaintiff is equitably

entitled. In the case of Rutherford County v. City of Murfreesboro2
there was an enrichment of the defendant but no corresponding loss
to the plaintiff, since the plaintiff was never the equitable owner of
any part of the funds received by the defendant. There a contract
between TVA and the city permitted but did not require the city
to use as general funds that part of the revenues from its electric
system equivalent to taxes on that system. The city retained for its
general use that part of the electric system revenues which would
have been the equivalent of the state, county and city taxes, if that
system had been subject to taxes. It was held that there was no constructive trust for the benefit of the county in that part of the funds of
the electric system retained by the city which is the equivalent of the
county tax. The court found that the county tax equivalent was never
equitably owned by the county, since municipal property used exclusively for municipal purposes is exempt from taxation.
Where a mortgagee forecloses on trust property and the trustee bids
in the property for himself, he can be compelled to hold the property
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiaries of the trust, subject to
a lien for the amount the trustee paid for the property. If a trustee
were permitted to make such a purchase for himself he would be
2. 304 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1957).
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under a temptation to let the property be foreclosed and to discourage
other bidders in order to get the property for himself below its market
value. A trustee is in effect buying trust property for himself, if it
is sold at a foreclosure sale to a third person who has agreed previously
to reconvey it to trustee individually. But, as the case of Bedford v.
Mege13 shows, if a third person, without such an agreement, buys the
property at the foreclosure sale for himself and with his own money
and subsequently sells it to the trustee, no constructive trust arisesi
In the Bedford case the decedent died intestate, leaving a widow
and minor children and land encumbered by a mortgage securing a
loan and waiving the homestead exemption. X bought the land at a
mortgage foreclosure sale for $777.77. Three weeks later X sold the
land to the widow for $900. The deed to X and X's deed to the widow
were recorded on the same day. The widow conveyed the property
to the defendants and the children claimed an interest therein. The
court held that this claim was without merit, as X acted for himself
and not as the widow's agent in buying the land at the foreclosure
sale, and in reselling it to the widow, and the widow acted for herself and in her own right in buying the land, and did not acquire the
land by way of a payment or a redemption of a mortgage in which the
children were co-owners of the equity of redemption.
RESULTING TRUST
A resulting trust arises where property is transferred to a defendant
under circumstances which raise an inference that the transfer was
not intended to be for the defendant's benefit. A common type of
resulting trust occurs where property is taken in the name of one
person and the purchase price is paid by another. Thus, if A pays
the purchase price of real estate and the deed is made to B, B presumably holds upon a resulting trust for A. This presumption is rebutted,
however, by evidence that A did in fact intend that B should have the
beneficial interest. Thus, if B is A's wife, the inference is that A
intended to make a gift to her.4 But if B is not the natural object of
A's bounty, there is an inference of a resulting trust. If A purchases
property and takes title in the name of B for the purpose of defrauding
creditors, or for some other illegal purpose, the illegality will prevent
A from obtaining restitution.
However, Chappell v. Dawson5 held that where a woman who was
illegally cohabiting with a man paid the purchase price of a lot and
also $5,000 for the erection of a building thereon, and the title to the
3. 301 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1957).

4. Kinkead v. State, 303 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1957).
5. 308 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1957).
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lot was taken in the name of the man, there was a resulting trust in
favor of the woman and the infant child born as a result of the cohabitation. The court considered that the illicit cohabitation was not
sufficiently related to the transaction to make the clean hands doctrine applicable.

